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In a competitive electricity market, nodal pricing is the most efficient way to 
manage congestion. Counter-trading is inefficient as it gives the wrong long term 
signals for entry and exit of power plants. However, in a non-competitive market, 
additional entry will improve the competitiveness of the market, and will increase 
social benefit by reducing price-cost margins. This paper studies whether the potential 
pro-competitive entry effects could make counter-trading more efficient than nodal 
pricing. We find that this is not the case, and that counter-trading is likely to have a 
negative effect on overall welfare. The potential benefits of additional competition 
(more competitive prices and lower production cost) do not outweigh the distortions 
(additional investment cost for the entrant, and socialization of the congestion cost to 
final consumers). 
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1  Introduction 
Internal congestion on the high and medium voltage transmission network is 
becoming a structural problem in several regions in Europe. For instance, in the Netherlands, 
congestion required the government to change its regulatory framework in 2009 (Hakvoort et 
al., 2009). Congestion within Sweden (and pressure from the European Commission) obliged 
the Swedish network operator in 2010 to subdivide the Swedish electricity market into 
several zones.
2  
The current legal systems have not been designed to deal with this type of problems 
as national physical network constraints were often neglected by policy makers. The further 
integration of green energy and larger energy flows as the consequence of international trade 
into the system make it harder for policy makers to neglect these physical constraints. Hence, 
new regulatory frameworks need to be implemented to solve the congestion problem. 
  There are several ways to deal with congestion. The theoretically most efficient 
congestion management method recognizes the physical limitations of the network and 
creates regional (or nodal) electricity markets. Such a method is for instance used in the PJM 
market (nodal spot pricing). Under nodal spot pricing, electricity prices reflect physical 
constraints, i.e. the capacity limits of the transmission lines and Kirchoff's laws, and hence, 
scarcity of the transmission network. In the short run, nodal spot prices therefore ensure 
optimal usage of the transmission network. In the long run, they give the optimal incentives 
for new investments. This is the option that Sveska Kraftnät, the Swedish network operator 
will follow. 
An alternative way to manage internal congestion is a system of counter-trading. 
Under this method, once congestion is observed in the network, the network operator will 
counter-trade against the flow of congestion, thereby reducing the flow over the line, until the 
congestion is eliminated. This system might be preferred to nodal pricing if congestion 
problems are expected to last only for a limited number of years (transmission investments 
will reduce congestion), and implementing nodal spot pricing is considered to be too 
cumbersome or too costly. This system might also be politically more acceptable. Introducing 
nodal spot pricing will often involve transfers between agents that are much greater than the 
net welfare gain. This is likely to make its introduction hard from a political point of view 
(Green, 2007). Counter-trading reduces those transfers.  The counter-trading option was 
chosen in the Netherlands.  
                                                 
2 Decision of the European Commission on 14 April 2010, IP/10/425.    3
In a perfectly competitive market, nodal spot pricing is the most efficient way to deal 
with congestion. Counter-trading is inefficient as it gives the wrong long term signals for 
entry and exit of power plants, and hence, causes over-entry in export constrained areas and 
under-entry in import constrained areas. In a non-competitive (oligopolistic) market, entry 
will improve the competitiveness of the market, and will increase total social surplus. Since 
under counter-trading entrants in the export constraint area receive an implicit subsidy, there 
will be more entry, the level of competition in the market might increase, and the price-cost 
margin will reduce. When the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs proposed to introduce 
counter-trading it argued that this positive competitive effect of new entry would outweigh 
the potential negative inefficiency effects (MinEZ, 2008a, 2008b).  
We study whether this competitive entry effect makes counter-trading more efficient 
than market splitting (i.e. nodal pricing)
3. To achieve this goal, we build a stylized electricity 
market model that endogenizes the entry decision in the export constrained area, and derive 
the welfare effect of additional entry caused by counter-trading. All along we assume that 
there is no effect on entry in the import constrained area. Taking this potential negative effect 
on competition of countertrading (compared to nodal pricing) into account, would only 
strengthen our result that any competitive benefits of countertrading are outweighed by the 
loss in efficiency.  
We consider an electricity market with two regions which are connected with a 
congested transmission line. An incumbent firm is active in both regions, demand is present 
in one region (the import constrained region) and the entrant, if it incurs an entry cost, can 
invest in the other region (the export constrained zone). If it invests, the entrant, which is 
assumed to be more efficient than the incumbent, will displace production of the incumbent 
in the export constrained zone.  
Under nodal pricing and perfect competition, entry into the electricity market is 
efficient as the entrant’s private benefit of entry is equal to the social benefit of entry. 
Counter-trading, on the other hand, implies an implicit subsidy to entrants in the export 
constrained area (and potentially a tax in the import constrained area) whenever the market is 
congested. Entrants will therefore overinvest in the export constrained region and underinvest 
in the import constrained area. Hence, in a competitive market, counter-trading reduces total 
surplus as locational investment incentives are distorted.  
                                                 
3 This paper focuses on the competitive effect of entry, assuming that one firm is already present in the 
market. Dijk et al. (2009) study the dynamic effect of entry in a multi-period setting with sequential entry by 
strategic firms. They consider both the first-mover advantage of entry and the option value of waiting.   4
If firms have market power, additional entry in the export constrained area might have 
a positive effect on total surplus by improving the competitiveness of the sector. We test 
whether it outweighs the aforementioned reduction in total surplus. In the framework of our 
model we find the following results: 
First, we study the effect of entry when the transmission line is congested. With nodal 
pricing, entry in the export constrained zone will lower the price in the import constrained 
zone. When the entrant invests, the incumbent’s imports are displaced by the entrant's, the 
inframarginal rents of the incumbent decrease, and its incentives to raise prices are mitigated. 
Although the investment incentives of the entrant are larger with counter trading, the pro-
competitive effect does not exist, because the incumbent receives a compensation for its 
displaced capacity in the export constrained area. Hence nodal pricing has a larger pro-
competitive effect and is better from a social viewpoint.  
Second, we show that during the hours without congestion, additional entry will make 
the market more competitive, but, also find that the competitive effect does not outweigh the 
additional investment cost that the entrant incurs and that subsidizing entry is socially not 
optimal.  
Combining the results for congested and non-congested hours, it is evident that nodal 
pricing is socially preferred to counter-trading.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
nodal spot pricing and counter-trading. In section 3, the stylized electricity market model is 
introduced. Section 4 analyzes the welfare effects of counter-trading and nodal spot pricing 
on both the perfectly competitive and the oligopolistic electricity market. Section 5 
concludes. 
2  Literature Review 
The concept of nodal spot pricing on electricity markets originates from the work of 
Schweppe et al. (1988). In the short run, nodal spot pricing ensures that regional prices reflect 
physical constraints (i.e. congestion on the transmission lines), and hence, scarcity on the 
transmission network. Therefore, nodal spot prices ensure optimal usage of the transmission 
network in the short run (Hogan, 1992).  
The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection introduced nodal 
pricing in April, 1998. The PJM market encompasses the movement of wholesale electricity 
in 13 US states (some partially) and the District of Columbia. This market has a spot market 
coordinated by an independent system operator (ISO). The ISO gathers both the bilateral 
schedules and the voluntary bids of the market participants, and determines the associated 
locational marginal cost prices (while accounting for security-constrained dispatch of the   5
power flows). When the transmission system is constrained, the spot prices can differ 
substantially across locations. The transmission charge for bilateral transactions is given by 
the difference in the locational prices between origin and destination. An accompanying 
system of fixed transmission rights (FTR) provides financial hedges between locations 
(Hogan, 1998).  
In Western Europe, full nodal congestion pricing is not used. Prices are imposed to be 
uniform within a country
4, and price differences between zones reflect, more or less, cross-
border congestion. In order to deal with congestion within a country, counter-trading is used. 
This market based approach allocates scarce transmission capacity among the different 
market players. Under counter-trading, firms are paid for not producing in the export 
constrained area. Also in the Nordic countries, such a system is used. Zonal prices reflect 
inter-zonal constraints, and counter-trading is implemented when the network operator is 
faced with intra-zonal congested paths (Bjørndal et al., 2003). 
A standard counter-trading scheme works (approximately) as follows: 
First, based on the supply and demand schedule bids of the market participants on the 
spot market, the market is cleared while ignoring any grid limitations. Second, the network 
operators check where generation on the grid has to be reduced or increased, so that 
congestion can be relieved. Third, these increases and decreases in generation are determined 
using a separate balancing market. Generators offer transmission adjustment bids on this 
market. Fourth, the system operator selects the least expensive bids for increases and 
decreases in generation and pays the respective generators. Hence, some generators are 
constrained off and compensated with the equilibrium price of the market for generation 
reductions, whereas others are constrained on and receive the equilibrium price for generation 
increases.
5 
It is clear that this mechanism induces costs for the system operator, since he has to 
buy and resell energy according to the adjustment bids of the generators. On the Nordic 
market, these counter trading costs are financed through the fixed charges of the network 
tariff, i.e., the costs are socialized (Hakvoort et al., 2009, Bjørndal et al., 2003).  
                                                 
4 There are some exceptions. For instance, Italy and Norway have price zones which are considerably 
smaller than the whole country. 
5 As a referee correctly pointed out, in some markets generators are paid according the pay-as-bid rule 
and not the market price when they are constrained-off.     6
Under such a system, it is plausible that uniform prices may lead to suboptimal 
dispatching of power plants.
6 Green (2007) shows that, in a competitive market, the negative 
welfare effects of prices which do not reflect transmission constraints may reduce welfare 
with a few percentage points. However, taking into account the long-term effects on 
investment decisions and the occurrence of strategic behaviour may increase the negative 
effects of uniform prices and counter-trading. The combination of zonal prices and counter-
trading has been criticized by several authors. 
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) show that it is impossible to define transmission 
capacity on cross-border transmission lines uniquely. Using a simple six-node model in 
which only two lines have limited capacities, they show that zones can be constructed in 
different ways. The number of possible zones becomes substantial in the meshed part of the 
continental submarket of Europe where many line capacities may be binding. Hence, the 
authors argue that choosing ‘good’ zones may be a difficult and important problem. 
Furthermore, freezing of zones is not a solution, because the characteristics of ‘good’ 
partitioning may change over time. 
Bjørndal (2000) and Bjørndal and Jörnsten (2001) study how an electricity network 
can be optimally divided in a limited set of price zones. They show that an optimal definition 
of zones requires the solution of a complex integer optimization problem. They argue that 
contrary to the belief that the zonal approach is easier to put into practice, implementing 
zonal pricing is more complex than implementing nodal spot pricing.  
While there are several papers exploring the possibility of strategic behavior under 
nodal pricing – for instance, Borenstein et al. (2000) find that under nodal pricing limited 
transmission capacity can give a firm the incentive to restrict its output in order to congest 
transmission into its area of dominance – little attention is given to this topic under counter-
trading. Following a similar line of reasoning as Borenstein et al. (2000), we argue that 
counter-trading leads to strategic bidding by generators. The idea is that firms in the export 
constrained area will have an incentive to bid a very low price in the energy market to be sure 
that congestion will be created, and hence, receive a payment for not producing under a 
counter-trading scheme. This method of strategic bidding may reduce market efficiency. Also 
in the import constrained region, firms might adjust their bids strategically. The intuition is 
that the firms in the import constrained area will understand that, due to internal congestion, 
their production capacity becomes more valuable in the importing region as their production 
                                                 
6 As noted by one of the referees, counter-trading can lead to an optimal short-run dispatch, if all 
consumers and generators are able to participate in the counter trading market.  In practice, however, (small) 
consumers are often unable to participate.    7
plants have an increased opportunity to be called upon in the counter-trading market. As a 
result those generators will increase their bids also in the spot market. The reason is that the 
opportunity cost of their production plants has increased. Moreover, these effects might be 
aggravated if firms strategically create congestion by withholding capacity in the import 
constrained area, and scheduling more capacity in the export constrained area
7. 
The overall price effect of strategic bids under counter-trading is undetermined. Some 
firms are bidding lower (in the export constrained area), and other firms are bidding higher 
(in the import constrained area). Therefore, it may be that the total supply function does not 
change fundamentally, and hence, prices on the market could remain fairly constant. 
Bjørndal et al. (2003) argue that the simultaneous use of market splitting and counter-
trading might also give rise to strategic behaviour by network operators. They show that it is 
indeed possible to replace a real intra-zonal constraint by a fake constraint on an inter-zonal 
line. The incentive for the network operator is that he does not have to pay for the costs of 
counter-trading this way. The incentive to move the constraint under such a system exists 
also for the market participants. They are faced with decreased transmission tariffs when 
counter-trading costs are eliminated, and might also be able to change the zonal prices when a 
real intra-zonal constraint is replaced by a fake constraint on an inter-zonal line. 
The consensus in the literature is that counter-trading is less efficient than nodal spot 
pricing. Although there are some important strategic considerations, the most prominent 
reason for this is the argument that locational price signals are distorted under counter-
trading.  
Most papers neglect the dynamic effects of counter-trading on entry decisions. One 
exception is Hers et al. (2009) who develop numerical simulation models of the European 
electricity market comparing different types of congestion management schemes. They find 
that the benefits of introducing redispatch outweigh the costs of the status quo situation in 
which no firms would be allowed to enter the market. The study differs from our study in 
three important aspects: (1) The entry decisions of the entrants are taken as given. (2) The 
standard nodal pricing model is not considered as a scenario, instead different variants of the 
counter trading model are compared. (3) The strategic incentives of generators are taken into 
account by studying the profitability of sensible but ad-hoc deviations of the competitive 
benchmark. We have a much simpler set-up, but try to provide more in depth intuition for the 
strategic and entry effects.  
                                                 
7 See for instance Küpper and Willems (2007) for a discussion on how a monopolist, on a market 
characterized by market splitting, might create congestion when it has production capacity on both ends of a 
possibly congested line.   8
3  Model 
This section presents a stylized model of an electricity market with congestion. We 
consider an electricity market with one small export constrained area and one large import 
constrained area that are connected by a transmission line with a capacity for K  units of 
electricity. See Figure 1. The import constrained area can be thought of as a densely 
populated area with a large demand level but relatively few opportunities for new 
investments. There is no demand in the export constrained area, but there is ample space for 
new investments. Examples for this set-up could be the Norwegian electricity market or the 
England and Wales market. In both cases, there is cheap generation capacity in the north, but 
the main load area is in the south. 
An incumbent player is active in both areas of the market, while an entrant player can 
only enter in the export constrained area. Consumers are only present in the import 
constrained area. In the export constrained area, the marginal production costs of the 
incumbent and the entrant are  I c  and  E c , respectively, with  E I cc  . Hence, we assume that 
the entrant has a cost advantage compared to the incumbent. This assumption makes it more 
likely that entry is beneficial for society, as it will reduce overall production costs, and 
therefore, makes it more likely that counter-trading will socially outperform nodal pricing. 
In the export constrained area, the installed generation capacity of the incumbent and 
the entrant (if it enters), is equal to  I k  and  E k , with  , IE kk k  . The fixed cost of entry is 
given by F . In the import constrained area, the constant marginal production cost for the 
incumbent is given by  I Cc  . There is no capacity constraint on production in the import 
constrained area. Consumers, which are only present in the import constrained area, are price 
takers and pay a price  p  for their electricity. Furthermore, we assume that demand is always 
larger than 2k  for the relevant price range that we consider. The price in the export 
constrained area will be denoted by 
* p . 
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the transmission line is congested, and that 
only one of the firms can produce in the export constrained area (K k  ). If there is 
congestion, the entrant will replace k  units of the production of the incumbent in the export 
constrained area. If there is no regional congestion ( 2 K k  ), then the entrant will, as it is 
more efficient, replace k  units of the production of the incumbent in the import constrained 
area.    9
 
Figure 1. Stylized representation of the market 
 
4  Analysis  
The analysis consists of three steps. We first show that under perfect competition, 
entry is efficient under nodal pricing, but inefficient with counter-trading. In the second step, 
we test whether the competitive effect of additional entry might offset the negative effects of 
inefficient entry for an oligopolistic market. We show that the entrant does not bring about a 
pro-competitive effect under counter-trading, as the incumbent is compensated for any loss of 
market power. Hence, nodal pricing outperforms counter-trading here. In the last step, we 
assume that the line is non-congested during some hours of the day, and test whether the pro-
competitive effect during those hours, outweighs the negative efficiency effects. We find that, 
even during the hours that there is no congestion, the competitive effect of additional entry is 
insufficient to justify the introduction of counter-trading.  
4.1  Perfect competition 
This section shows that, under perfect competition, entry is efficient with nodal 
pricing, but inefficient with counter-trading. In particular, we show that, under counter-
trading, the private incentives to enter are larger than the social ones.  
First, we assume that nodal spot pricing is used to manage congestion. Since the 
entrant is more efficient, he will replace the production of the incumbent in the export 
constrained area and supply K  units of electricity to the import constrained area. 
Furthermore, as there is competition in the export constrained area to sell energy through the 
transmission line, the “nodal” price 
* p  in the export constrained area will be equal to the 
incumbent’s cost 
*
I p c  . Figure 2.A shows that the private benefit of entry (the profit the 
entrant makes in the spot market minus the entry costs 
* () E p cKF   ) is equal to the benefit 














Both are equal to the size of area A minus the fixed entry cost. Hence, the entrant has the 
right incentives to enter the market.  
 
Proposition 1: In a perfectly competitive market, using nodal pricing to manage congestion, 




Figure 2. Perfect competition with congestion 
 
We will now compare nodal pricing with counter-trading. In this framework, the 
incumbent and the entrant in the export constrained area will place “cost bids to produce”. 
The firm with the lowest cost bid will produce, and the other firm will be compensated for 
not being able to supply.  
 
Proposition 2: It is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium for the entrant to bid its marginal 
cost, and for the incumbent to bid slightly above.  
 
The proof of proposition 2 is derived in appendix I. The result of this equilibrium is presented 
in Figure 2.B. The incumbent will not produce and receive a compensation of ( ) E p cK   for 
being unable to supply K units of electricity to the market. The entrant simply earns its 
margin on production and receives ( ) E p cKF   . This is the private value of entry. In the 
figure, this is equal to the area A + B minus the fixed cost of entry F.
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Proposition 3: In a perfectly competitive market with counter-trading the private benefit of 
entry is larger than the benefit to society. 
 
The social value of entry is equal to the cost savings of having K  units produced 
more efficiently by the entrant minus the investment costs: () EI cc K F   , i.e. area A minus 
the fixed entry cost. Hence, the private benefit of entry is larger than the benefit to society, 
and there is over-entry under counter-trading.  
Furthermore, the costs of counter-trading, i.e. the subsidy to the incumbent (area A + 
B), and the additional subsidy to the entrant (area B) come at a cost for society. Often those 
costs are socialized, which creates further welfare losses. Energy users will pay a higher final 
energy price t, the consumer surplus will decrease, and an additional dead-weight loss is 
created (See Figure 2.B).  
Summarizing, we show that in a perfectly competitive market, nodal pricing 
outperforms counter-trading as the latter gives the wrong signals for entry (and exit) of power 
plants. Counter-trading comes with an additional inefficiency if the costs of counter-trading 
are socialized. In the following section, we study whether the competitive entry effect makes 
counter-trading more efficient than nodal spot pricing when the market has an oligopolistic 
nature.  
4.2  Market Power 
This section compares the efficiency of nodal pricing and counter-trading when the 
market is oligopolistic, i.e. there is a positive price cost margin  p C   in the import 
constrained area.  
Assume that nodal pricing is used as a method to solve congestion. Again, 
competition in the export constrained area will drive down the market price to 
*
I p c    See 
Figure 3. Given that the entrant is more efficient, he will replace the production of the 
incumbent in the export constrained area and supply K units of electricity to the import 
constrained area.  The profit of the entrant is equal the profit in the spot market minus the 
investment cost: ( ) IE cc K F   (Area A in Figure 3.A minus the fixed cost). The incumbent 
loses market share (its own imports are displaced by the entrant’s), and therefore will behave 
more competitively. Hence, the price drops from the pre-entry price  ˆ p  to the post-entry price 
p , and the dead weight loss will decrease. This is indicated with DWG (Deadweight Gain) in 
Figure 3.A. The social benefit of entry is equal to ( ) IE cc K D W G F   .  
   12
Proposition 4: In an oligopolistic market with nodal pricing, the private benefit of entry in the 
export constrained region is smaller than the benefit to society. Subsidizing entry might be 
optimal.  
  Note that the entrant does not benefit from the fact that the incumbent has market 
power in the import constrained area (and the high price  p ) due to congestion. However, 
entry reduces the market share of the incumbent, and reduces its incentives to set high prices.  
 
Figure 3. Oligopolistic competition with congestion 
Now consider the case in which the incumbent will be compensated for losing its 
market share to the more efficient entrant by the means of counter-trading. For this case, we 
first examine the effect of entry on the price in the import constrained area under counter-
trading.  
 
Proposition 5:  The profit maximizing incumbent in the import constrained area will not 
change its behavior on the spot market post-entry under counter-trading.  
 
A formal proof of proposition 5 is derived in appendix II. The intuition for this result 
is that the incumbent is being compensated for losing market share, and therefore will not 
change its strategic behavior after entry. The incumbent’s profit before entry is given by the 
area B + C + D in Figure 3.B.  The profit after entry is equal to the area (A + B + C + D). It 
consists of two parts: profit for not producing in the export constrained area (equal to A + B 
+ C ) and a profit for producing in the import constrained area (area D). The incumbent will 
set the price  p  as to maximize its overall surplus. This price is the same under both regimes.  
Hence, given that the incumbent’s behavior does not change, the post-entry price level 
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welfare effect of entry by the more efficient entrant. Since the entrant is more efficient, he 
will supply the K units of electricity to the import constrained area. The private benefit of the 
entrant is given by area A + B + C minus the fixed costs of entry, or ( ) E p cKF  . The 
private benefit of the incumbent is given by the compensation it receives from the counter-
trading scheme and equal to () E pcK  . Furthermore, note that the competitive pressure does 
not reduce the deadweight loss as prices do not change ( ˆ p p  ). However, the socialization 
of counter-trading costs (energy users pay final energy price t) would increase the deadweight 
loss. 
 
Proposition 6: In an oligopolistic market with counter-trading the private benefit of entry is 
larger than the benefit to society. 
 
Hence, the result is over-investment. While the private benefit of the entrant is given 
by () E p cKF  , (the area A + B + C  minus the fixed entry cost), the benefit to society of 
having K units of electricity produced more efficiently after incurring the entry costs is equal 
to  
 () D W L IE cc K F    (1) 
(or: area A minus the fixed entry cost and the dead weight loss).  
 
Proposition 7: For every realization of the investment cost F  of the entrant, nodal pricing is 
at least as good as counter-trading.  
 
First, assume that the entrant enters in a regime with nodal pricing. Then it will for 
sure enter in a counter-trading regime. Welfare will be higher under nodal pricing, as the 
competitive effect only occurs under nodal pricing, and counter-trading implies an additional 
dead weight loss. 
Second, assume that the entrant does not enter with nodal pricing. This implies that 
the cost advantage of the entrant does not outweigh the investment costs. If in that case the 
entrant would enter under counter-trading, total welfare will be lower, as not only total costs 
will increase ( ( ) IE Fcc K  ), but also an additional dead weight loss is created.  
Summarizing, in an oligopolistic market, there will be over-entry when counter-
trading is implemented. When the market is congested, there is no pro-competitive effect, but 
counter-trading introduces extra costs, namely the cost of entry and the cost of socializing the 
compensation payments. Nodal pricing always outperforms counter-trading.    14
4.3  Competitive effects during non-congested hours 
Suppose that congestion is not permanent, but that for some fraction of the time the 
transmission line is uncongested. Hence, the entrant receives an implicit subsidy during the 
hours that there is congestion, which increases entry, and additionally, this subsidy creates a 
pro-competitive effect during the hours that there is no congestion. Will counter-trading in 
this situation be more efficient than nodal pricing?  
Figure 4 shows the market equilibrium, and the welfare effect of entry, assuming that 
the transmission line has a sufficiently large capacity to accommodate both the entrant and 
the incumbent firm.   
 
 
Figure 4. Oligopolistic competition without congestion 
Due to entry, the market becomes more competitive, less efficient firms lose market 
share (kE is now produced by the entrant instead of the incumbent in the import constrained 
zone), and price drops from  ˆ p  to  p . Since the entrant is more efficient and does not face any 
congestion when exporting, it is able to produce  E k , and will make a profit  
 () EE pck F   . (2) 
The social value of entry is given by the reduction in production costs (area A + B in 
Figure 4) and the deadweight gain (DWG in Figure 4) minus the fixed cost of entry F,
9 or: 
 () EE DWG C c k F    (3) 
Whether the entrant has the right incentives to enter the market is derived in Appendix III for 
a simple Cournot model with n incumbent firms.  
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Proposition 8: In an oligopolistic market without congestion, entrants generally enter too 
often. Only if entrants can capture a very large market share will entry benefit society. 
 
In appendix we show that only if the production capacity of the entrant  E k  covers a 












For instance, for a market with four oligopolistic firms ( 4 n  ), additional entry in the export 
constrained area should cover at least 89% of total market demand in order to increase total 
surplus. Hence, small entrants under counter-trading will have the wrong long term signals 
for entry and will enter the market too often. Therefore, we argue that it is very unlikely that 
the additional entry due to counter-trading will have a positive effect on total surplus during 
the hours that the line is not congested. Even if there would be a positive welfare effect 
during uncongested hours, this has to be weighted against the cost of socializing the implicit 
subsidy.  
 
Proposition 9: Nodal pricing will always outperform counter-trading if the size of the entrant 
is small.  
 
First, assume that the entrant does not enter under nodal pricing, but enters under 
counter-trading. Welfare will then be lower under counter-trading than under nodal pricing. 
The reason for this is that the private benefit for the firm under nodal pricing is an upper limit 
for welfare under counter-trading.  
Second, assume that the entrant enters under nodal pricing. It will therefore also enter 
under counter-trading. Also in this case welfare will be lower under counter-trading for the 
same reasons as before: the competitive effect is larger under nodal pricing and recovering 
the subsidies creates an additional deadweight loss under counter-trading.  
4.4  Robustness of the results 
We have shown that additional entry in the export constrained area by the 
introduction of counter-trading is unlikely to improve total surplus. This result was derived 
assuming that: (1) the introduction of counter-trading would have no effect on entry in the 
import constraint area, (2) entrants in the export constraint area would behave competitively, 
and (3) the entrant had a lower marginal cost than the incumbent. This section shows that 
when those assumptions are relaxed our main results are likely to be reinforced.   16
First, since locational signals for entry are distorted due to the implicit subsidy created 
by counter-trading, it may reduce entry in regions where firms do not receive an implicit 
subsidy. Additional entry in the export constrained area (due to the implicit subsidy) will 
delay investments in the import constrained area. Those delays might have a significant 
welfare costs as those investments would have had a competitive effect not only during the 
hours where there is no congestion, but also at times when there is congestion.  
Second, in practice, entrants often sign long-term contracts with the incumbent firms. 
By signing those contracts, small entrants, such as combined heat and power plants, become 
de-facto part of incumbent firms. Hence, the competitive effect of entry will disappear, and 
counter-trading will only have a negative effect on the overall welfare level.  
Third, if the entrant has higher marginal costs than the incumbent, then the entrant 
might displace production of a more efficient, but less competitive incumbent. This would 
make it less likely for subsidizing entry to be socially optimal. 
5  Conclusion 
This paper compares two mechanisms to manage congestion in the electricity market: 
nodal pricing and counter-trading. Nodal pricing gives efficient long term price signals to 
firms with respect to their investment location, as prices reflect the scarcity of network 
resources. Compared with nodal pricing, counter-trading implies an implicit subsidy to firms 
in the export constrained area whenever there is congestion, and an implicit tax on firms in 
the import constrained area. Counter-trading therefore distorts the long term investment 
signals. If no other  market imperfections are present, then the regional misallocation of 
investments will reduce overall welfare.  
In this paper we test whether nodal pricing still outperforms counter-trading when 
there is market power in the generation market. A possible rational for this is the following: 
With nodal prices, firms in export constrained areas pay a higher price for accessing the 
network than in import constrained areas. This price implicitly forms an entry barrier in 
export constrained areas. By introducing counter-trading this entry barrier is lowered, and 
more firms will enter in the export constrained area, making the market more competitive.  
With our model, we show that this will not increase overall welfare: The positive 
competitive effects of more entry in the export constrained area do not outweigh the 
investment cost of the new firms. There are three reasons why this is the case: 
1.  With counter trading, the incumbent firm is compensated for the displacement of its 
imports by the entrant's. Setting a higher price in the import constrained zone increases 
the size of the compensation it receives. Therefore, the incentives of the incumbent do not   17
change with entry, and it charges the same price before and after entry. There is no 
competitive effect of counter trading.  
2.  If there is no congestion, entry has a positive effect on market power, but subsidizing 
entry is socially not optimal. The reason for this is that there is already too much entry 
without a subsidy, because the entrant wants to steal the rents of the incumbent, but rent 
stealing itself does not improve welfare.  
3.  Counter-trading requires that additional funds are collected from network users. This 
creates a dead weight loss for society.  
 
Summarizing: Counter-trading is an inefficient tool to manage congestion, and an ineffective 
instrument to promote competition in the electricity market. It subsidizes entry at locations 
where it is least needed, i.e. at those parts of the network with a generation surplus.  
We therefore would suggest that regulators and governments seriously consider the 
introduction of a nodal (or zonal) pricing model (cf. Sweden) as an alternative of a counter-
trading model (cf. the Netherlands).  
When promoting ‘green energy’ investments in generation, governments might be tempted to 
interfere with the congestion management scheme and give additional benefits to “green 
electrons” on the network. We are convinced, that replacing nodal pricing with counter 
trading as a way to subsidize green energy is inefficient. Counter-trading acts as an implicit 
subsidy both to the entrant and the incumbent. Offering a subsidy only to the green producers 
would reduce the overall costs for reaching the goal of subsidizing green energy. Counter-
trading implies a subsidy to green energy in the export constrained areas but not for green 
energy in the import constrained area, while the producers in the import constrained area are 
more likely to improve competition, and more likely to be able to bring their green energy to 
final consumers. Counter trading is therefore not likely to induce green energy producers to 
invest in the right location, and arguably not the most efficient strategy to bring about a more 
sustainable society.  
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Appendix 
I.  Nash equilibria of counter-trading bids 
Under counter-trading, the incumbent and the entrant in the export constrained area 
will place “cost bids” indicating their willingness to produce. We denote the bids of the 
entrant and the incumbent by  E B  and  I B , respectively. The firm that bids the lowest variable 
cost will be allowed to export K  units of electricity to the import constrained area. The other 
firm will receive a compensation for not being able to supply equal to () p BK  , with B    19
equal to its bid, and  p  the price in the import constrained area. We will now derive the best 
response correspondence for the incumbent and the entrant in a game .  
For  E I B c  , the incumbent’s best response correspondence is to bid slightly above 
the entrant:  IE BB  , with   very small, since in this case he receives a compensation of
() E I pB p c      for every unit of electricity produced by the entrant. For  E I Bc  , the 
incumbent’s best response correspondence is to undercut the entrant by bidding  I E B B  , 
thereby undercutting the entrant and receiving  I p c   for every unit produced.  
For  I E B c  , the entrant’s best response correspondence is to bid just above the 
incumbent,  EI BB   , since it will then receive a compensation of  () I E pB p c     . 
For I E B c  , the entrant’s best response correspondence is to bid  E I B B  , thereby 
undercutting the incumbent and receiving  E p c   for every unit produced. 
Hence, any pair of bids ( , ) E I B B  for which  E EI cBc    and  IE BB   is a Nash 
equilibrium in this framework. In this case, the incumbent receives a compensation of   
(( ) ) E p BK    for not being able to supply the K  units of electricity to the market. The 
entrant will make a production profit of ( ) E p cK   in equilibrium. For receiving this profit 
the entrant paid an entry cost F . 
There is a large set of possible Nash equilibria. In the remainder of the paper we 
assume that the firms coordinate on the equilibrium that is Pareto dominant, i.e.   
(, ) EE IE Bc Bc   .  The price in the export constrained zone is then given by 
*
E p c  . 
II.  Profit maximization of the oligopolistic incumbent 
This appendix derives the regional prices under countertrading before and after entry 
occurred, and shows that the incentives for the incumbent do not change. We consider an 
incumbent monopoly, active in both the import and export constrained area, a fringe 
generator with supply function  ( )
F SP  in the import constrained area, and an inelastic level of 
demand in the import constrained area. We introduce the fringe generator here, as this firm is 
more likely than consumers to react to prices on short notice, and to arbitrage between the 
day-ahead-market and the counter trading market. The profit maximization problem of the 
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p Qq C Qcq
qK pp Q q 
    

 (5) 
Here, Q is the demand the incumbent faces in the import constrained area, while  I q  
denotes the supply of the incumbent in the export constrained area. The inverse demand 
function  () P   represents the residual demand function the incumbent faces in the import   20
constrained area. The price is determined by setting total (inelastic) demand 
D Q  equal to the 
sum of imports K , the (elastic) supply by a fringe firm  ()
F Sp  and the production of the 
monopolist Q: 
 ()
F D SP KQQ   




F p pQ K S Q Q K
      
Maximizing profits using the first order conditions gives 
  ' p (Q   k)(Q   k)   p(Q   k)   C    (6) 
where we assume that the line is sufficiently small, so that it is congested  I qk  . 
Now consider the profit maximization problem of the incumbent when entry occurs. 
This is slightly more complex as we have to take into account both the day ahead market and 
the balancing market.  The incumbent’s profit is the revenue in the day ahead market, plus the 
revenue from selling extra power in the import constrained area, minus the revenue it loses 
for being constrained-off in the export constrained area, minus production costs. 
 
 
** * () ( )
DA DA DA DA DA p QQ p Q Q p Q C Q          
where 
DA p  is the day ahead price,  p  the price in the import constrained area after counter 
trading, and 
* P  the price in the export constrained area. 
DA Q  and 
*DA Q  are the quantities sold 
in the day ahead market in the import constrained and the export constrained areas 
respectively and Q is the final production level in the import constrained area. 





F p pQ K S Q Q K
      
In the export constrained area, only the (competitive) entrant will be producing. The 
price in the export constrained area is  
 
*
E p c   
The  price in the day ahead market 
DA p   is determined by an arbitrage condition. 
Fringe producers will only sell in the day-ahead market, if they receive the same price in the 
day ahead market, as in the counter-trading market. Therefore:   
 
DA p p     21
If this would not be the case, then the fringe producers would reduce their supply in 
the day-ahead market, and increase their net sales in the countertrading market until the 
equation is satisfied.
10 
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Substituting the constraints we find the following optimization problem: 
  max ( ) ( ( ) ) E Q p QKQC Q p QK c K       
Maximizing profits using the first order conditions now gives 
   '( ) ( ) '( ) p QK Qp QK p QK KC    (7) 
When comparing the two first order conditions (7) and (6), we find that they are 
identical. Hence, the incumbent in the import constrained area will not change its behavior on 
the spot market post-entry. Therefore, the post-entry price level remains the same in our 
model. 
We derived this model for a monopoly case. A similar result can be derived for 
oligopoly models. As counter-trading refunds firms for lost market share, they will not 
become more competitive after entry.  
III.  Necessary condition for welfare improving subsidies 
A necessary condition for subsidizing entry to be welfare improving is that private 
incentives will lead to under-investments. This happens if the private incentives (of the 
entrant) to enter are smaller than the social incentives. In this appendix, we show when this is 
the case.  
The entrant will enter the market as long as its short term profit outweighs the 
investment costs: 
() B EE Fp c p k    , 
where  p   is the difference between the price before (pB) and after entry (pA), cE is the 
marginal cost, kE is the production, and F is the fixed cost of the entrant. 
                                                 
10 Note that the entrant does not have an incentive to arbitrage between the day ahead market price 
DA P  and the price in the counter trading market 
* P , as it would only reduce its profit.   22









   (8) 
where F is the fixed entry cost of the entrant, the second term represents the size of 
the reduction in deadweight loss (competitive effect), and the third term is the increase in 
producer surplus (efficiency gain).  
We assume that there are n symmetric incumbent Cournot firms in the import 
constrained area that have similar marginal costs C, and that the entrant is competitive and 
always produces at maximal capacity  E k . The price cost margins before and after entry are 


















  (10) 
In the post entry condition,  E k  is subtracted from the total level of demand to obtain 
the residual demand for the incumbent firm(s) in the import constrained area. Subtracting 








   (11) 
The price effect is proportional to the size of investments by the entrant, is smaller 
when the market has more firms (n), and if demand is more elastic (large  '( ) Dp).  










   (12) 
Replacing  p   and  B p C   with the expressions (10) and (11), we find that subsidizing entry 












If the size of the entrant is sufficiently large, it is optimal to subsidize its entry.  The 
critical minimal size depends on the number of incumbent firms present in the market, and 
the size of market demand. For instance, if there are two firms active in the import 
constrained area, the entry decision of the entrant will only be optimal if upon entry it will   23
take over at least four fifth of total electricity demand. If the total level of entry is less than 
this critical value, it is not optimal to subsidize entry, as it will lower overall welfare. Note 
that if we assume that the entrant would have a higher marginal cost than the incumbent firm, 
then it is even less likely that entry is going to be welfare improving.  
Hence, in our stylized model, small entrants will have the wrong long term signals for 
entry and will enter the market too often. Only if entrants are very large, will entry be 
optimal. 